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APPENDIX A: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTION REFORM

RECOMMENDATION

BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association favors (1) retention

of the constitutional office of Vice-President of the United States in its present
form, but urges each President to involve the Vice-President intimately and
productively in operations of the presidency, and (2) that in the nomination
and election process the Association (a) favors retention of the present practice
by which a newly-nominated presidential candidate recommends his or her
vice-presidential running mate to the party's nominating convention, and (b)
urges that each contender for a party's nomination announce a tentative list of
his or her potential vice-presidential running mates publicly prior to the
opening of the party convention, and (c) favors televised debate by vicepresidential candidates, as an integral part of any future presidential candidate debating series.
REPORT

Our Committee was created in October, 1973, to study such subjects as the
method of nominating and electing the President and Vice-President of the
United States and the financing of national political campaigns and was
charged with the responsibility of recommending proposals for improving the
federal election system. Pursuant to these directions, we have issued recommendations and reports concerning the abolition of the electoral college
system, public financing of political campaigns, procedures for voter registration by mail in federal elections, and the effectiveness of the 25th Amendment.
Our committee was created subsequent to the resignation from office of a
Vice-President and the withdrawal from the national ticket of a VicePresidential candidate. As a result of these events, we were especially charged
with evaluating proposals for improvement of the Vice-Presidency. Towards
this end we assembled for a Symposium on the Vice-Presidency at Fordham
University School of Law a group of political leaders, historians, political
scientists, lawyers, and other authorities on the Vice-Presidency. The group
consisted of United States Senator Birch Bayh; Joel Goldstein, a current
Rhodes Scholar at Oxford; United States Senator Robert Griffin; Ira Jackson,
Assistant Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government and co-author of its
Institute of Politics Report on Vice-Presidential Selection; Charles H. Kirbo,
Atlanta attorney and adviser to President Jimmy Carter; James C. Kirby,
Professor, New York University Law School; Joseph M. McLaughlin, Dean,
Fordham University Law School; Clarence M. Mitchell, Director, Washington Office, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;
Endicott Peabody, former Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and member of the Humphrey Commission on Vice-Presidential Selection;

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

George Reedy, Dean, College of Journalism, Marquette University, and
former aide to President Lyndon B. Johnson; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Albert
Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities of The City University of New York;
former United States Senator Margaret Chase Smith; William B. Spann, Jr.,
President-elect of the American Bar Association; and Donald Young, author
of "American Roulette: The History and Dilemma of the Vice Presidency."
The proceedings of the Symposium took place on December 3, 1976, were
widely reported in the press, and will be made available this year in published
form.

The Constitutional Scheme
Under Article II of the Constitution the Vice-President is given the duty to
discharge the powers and duties of President in case of the death, resignation,
removal, or inability of the President, and the duty to preside over the Senate.
The first duty has been discharged eight times when Presidents died in office
and, most recently, when a President resigned. The second duty has diminished over the course of history, although there are recent examples of
Vice-Presidents casting tie-breaking votes.
Until the twentieth century the Vice-President had practically no other
responsibilities than to be a successor to the President and to preside over the
Senate. In this century the Vice-President has become a regular member of
the President's Cabinet, a member of the National Security Council, a
statutory member of various other groups, and a representative of the
President. The Twenty-fifth Amendment adopted in 1967 assigns to the
Vice-President a role in the process of determining a President's inability.

Proposalsfor Change
A number of proposals relating to the office have been advanced since 1972.
These involve the process by which Vice-Presidents have been selected and
the duties of the office. Several persons, including Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
have suggested that the office be abolished in its entirety. A review of the
major proposals follows. 1
It has been suggested that the Vice-President should run for office and be
elected to it just as the President. This proposal would have candidates for
Vice-President running in state primaries and conventions and it would allow
the electorate to choose a candidate of a different party for Vice-President.

1. We incorporate by reference the special paper prepared at the request of and for our
Committee by Joel K. Goldstein, entitled "An Overview of the Vice Presidency," where these
proposals are discussed with some detail [Appendix B infra].
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It has been suggested that only candidates for the Presidency should run in
our regular quadrennial election and that after taking office a new President
should nominate a person for Vice-President under the provisions of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment.
Other proposals include requiring Presidential candidates to indicate their
choice for Vice-President prior to the commencing of the national conventions;
providing that the delegates to a convention will choose their party's candidate for Vice-President from a list of acceptable nominees supplied by the
Presidential candidate; and deferring the choice of a Vice-Presidential candidate to a "mini-convention" held a few weeks after the major convention.
The proposals with respect to the Vice-President's duties range from
abolishing his role as President of the Senate to expanding that role, for
example, by giving him the right to participate in Senate debates, to vote on
all questions, and to appoint Senate committees. Some proposals would
enlarge the Vice-President's statutory duties. Other proposals include procedures for a special election whenever the Vice-President succeeds to the
Presidency rather than have him serve for the remainder of the President's
term. Some of the special election proposals are addressed only to VicePresidents selected under the Twenty-fifth Amendment.

Summary of Recommendations
We have carefully considered all of the proposed reforms and the divergent
views expressed at our Committee-sponsored symposium on the VicePresidency. Based on our study, we are of the opinion that the office of
Vice-President should not be abolished and that its constitutional duties
should not be changed. We further believe that Presidential candidates should
continue to choose their running mates but that they should give advance
notice to the public of potential running mates who are not then candidates
for President. We also feel that Vice-Presidential debates should be encouraged.
Finally, we are of the view that the proper approach toward greater
utilization of Vice-Presidents is to encourage Presidents to involve them more
intimately and effectively in their administrations rather than to give VicePresidents permanent responsibilities that might limit their availability to
assist the President.

Discussion
The primary duty of the Vice-President is to become President if the need
should arise. Admittedly, this duty of waiting for some unfortunate incident is
not enough to keep a qualified person occupied or challenged. However, the
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value to our political system in having an acknowledged and accepted
successor far outweighs the fact that Vice-Presidents are at times underutilized.
Our Committee does not consider these proposals workable and desirable,
in part because our government and political system are best served by
accession of a President with full authority, who could help to unify the
country, rather than to require a divisive political campaign following immediately on the death, resigation, or removal of a President. Additionally, such
proposals would of necessity either drastically alter the Presidential nomination process or would have a caretaker government remain in office for an
unacceptably long interval. The fact that Vice-Presidents have been able to
take over the Presidency in times of major national trauma (specifically,
within recent memory, the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford transitions)
establishes the fact that the Vice-Presidency in its present form provides an
individual able to become President. Of vital importance, this individual is
immediately and fully accepted as President by Americans and by foreign
leaders. Since in our opinion the Vice-Presidency already performs its primary
role effectively-that of providing a President in an emergency-the needed
reforms in the office of Vice-President are in the nature of refinements, rather
than a major overhaul.
Clearly, it is desirable to design duties to further prepare Vice-Presidents to
assume the duties of the Presidency. This is a goal which is more easily stated
than achieved, however. To increase the Vice-President's duties within the
legislative branch of government is inconsistent with the thought that the
Vice-President's primary duty is to assume leadership of the executive branch
in an emergency. (The Vice-President is now the constitutionally mandated
presiding officer of the Senate, with a vote only in the case of a tie.) Increasing
the Vice-President's role in these day-to-day workings of the legislative
process, especially a role largely ceremonial, quite simply does not prepare the
incumbent for suddently taking over the executive branch.
For different constitutional reasons, we do not believe it practical to
increase the Vice-President's permanent duties within the executive branch.
To give him any major and exclusive executive authority would encroach
upon the authority of the President; under the Constitution "the executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States." As long as we have
a single executive who has full executive authority, we believe that the
Vice-Presidency should not be endowed with permanent executive duties.
In our view, Vice-Presidents should be used more as "ministers without
portfolio," in which capacity they can focus high-level government attention
on major problems and do so with the known and express approval and
implicit authority of the President. Vice-President Rockefeller's recent chairmanship of the Domestic Council Privacy Committee is a step in this
direction, and the use of future Vice-Presidents in similar and expanded roles
is to be encouraged. Such an expanded role clearly appears to be the mutual
intent of Vice-President Mondale and President Carter. Since the desire and
willingness of a President to productively employ the talents and expertise of a
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Vice-President appear to be the crucial determinants of a Vice-President's real
worth in the Executive Branch, the new Administration's stated intent is
noteworthy. An incoming Vice-President could not prepare better for succession to the Presidency than by participating in "all the crucial decision-making
processes establishing this government," as the Vice-President stated before
assuming his office.
President Carter's own pre-inaugural statement on the Vice-President's role
accurately describes the committee's sense of what a "minister without
portfolio" can be: "I think the extent to which he will be actively identified as
being very close to me and involved in the decision-making process will make
his functions within our own country and abroad much more effective."
It has also been proposed that the Vice-President be relieved of the
constitutional duty of presiding over the Senate and officially be made a part
of the Executive Branch. While such a change might have beneficial results,
we believe that it would be largely meaningless in view of the fact that
Vice-Presidents really spend little time presiding over the Senate. Nor would
officially making the Vice-President part of the Executive Branch be a
meaningful change unless he has also given some real executive duties: as
noted above that would be inconsistent with the role of the President.
Addressing the issue of Vice-Presidential selection, we feel that there is no
reform proposal preferable to the present system, under which the presidential
nominee exercises almost complete discretion in selecting a running mate. To
the extent that various reform proposals would give the Vice-President a
separate constituency from the President, they would serve to create greater
independence of the President. The Vice-President would be less a part of the
President's "team" and would be given even less in the way of meaningful
duties by the President if there were more independence of the President.
Thus, the Vice-President would become less prepared to assume the Presidency rather than more prepared. These difficulties would be compounded if
a Vice-President were individually elected who was a political antagonist of
the President. In this situation, the Vice-President, having a separate national
constituency and no real duties to keep him occupied, would likely become the
chief national critic of the President's policies and programs. Our political
systems already provide sufficient procedures for criticizing an administration's programs without institutionalizing in the office of the Vice-Presidency
the role of chief national critic. More fundamentally, such a role would be
inconsistent with the Vice-President's primary duty of preparing to become
President in an emergency.
The responsibility for selecting a Vice-Presidential nominee should remain
with the Presidential nominee. However, there are procedures which could
improve the selecting process. All too frequently, Vice-Presidents have been
selected in the early morning hours following a contested nomination. Too
often the results have been a Vice-Presidential nominee who was not well
known to the public, who may not even be well known to the Presidential
nominee, and who may have serious deficiencies. Nothing, of course, can
insure a perfect selection process, but the Committee believes the system can
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be improved. (For example, Spiro Agnew was selected as Vice-President twice
and served in that capacity for five years before evidence came to light of his
conduct as Governor.)
As we see it, the key is to have the political parties adopt procedures which
would require the contenders for the Presidential nomination to make public a
list of potential Vice-Presidential running mates sufficiently in advance of the
party convention to permit a more considered decision. Such lists can be
released early enough and be small enough to permit media and public
consideration of the potential candidates prior to convention week. Such lists
made public within a short period of time after the last Presidential primary
would be desirable. Such a procedure not only would permit a more thorough
public consideration of the relative records and abilities of the potential
candidates, but would also permit a more thorough consideration of those
factors by the Presidential nominee. This would likely improve the caliber of
the Vice-Presidential nominees and also improve the likelihood that the
Presidential nominee would select a running-mate with whom he was compatible. Such a result would likely produce Vice-Presidents who would be given
meaningful tasks by the President, thereby better preparing the VicePresident to assume the office of President when the need arose.
For several reasons we believe that these lists of Vice-Presidential possibilities should not be binding on the Presidential nominee. First, the
ultimately successful nominee should be free to pick any of the defeated
Presidential contenders though he may not want to name them on his list.
Additionally, one purpose of the list is to produce a more thorough examination of possible Vice-Presidents; if no contenders pass such examination, the
nominee should not be bound. In reaching the conclusion in favor of a
pre-convention procedure we considered the proposals for a post-convention
procedure. Such a selection, we felt, involved practical problems, such as the
delay and diversion it would cause in the development of a presidential
nominee's election campaign, and the unification of the nominee's political
party; its interference with the convention of a political party holding a later
convention; and its impact on the presidential nominee having a VicePresidential choice rejected so soon before the election. The suggestion that
the Vice-President not be selected until after the President was inaugurated
also was considered undesirable.
In the final analysis, we favor the choice of a Vice-President as at present
by the broad representation of a political party present at its national
convention. We do not favor, however, any requirement that a Presidential
candidate name his Vice-Presidential choice prior to his own nomination. We
also considered and rejected the proposals calling for an investigation of all
Vice-Presidential nominees by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We
consider such a mechanism unnecessary and potentially dangerous. The
Vice-President is, of course, a vital national figure, if for no other reason than
the fact that many Vice-Presidents go on to serve as Presidents. All too often,
however, the public votes for the Presidential candidate and has only limited
information about the Vice-Presidential candidate. Last year's VicePresidential debates countered this trend by focusing on the Vice-Presidential
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nominees independently of the Presidential candidates. It is felt that this
debate served a vital role and that such debates in future years should be
encouraged. Accordingly any impediment to such debates such as equal time
rules should be eliminated.
Respectfully submitted,
John D. Feerick, Chairman
Charles G. Armstrong
Joel Fleishman
Daniel L. Golden
Dale W. Read, Jr.
Stephen I. Schlossberg
Earl Sneed
William P. Trenkle, Jr.
Adopted February 1977
by the House of Delegates
American Bar Association

